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CASE NOTES
Antitrust Law-Unincorporated Subdivisions of a Single Corporation Held
Capable of Conspiracy under Section One of the Sherman Act.-Plaintiff
brought this action under section 4 of the Clayton Act 1 to recover treble damages
for injury occasioned by defendants' alleged violation of the provisions of the
Sherman Act. Plaintiff claimed that the defendants had entered into a conspiracy
to discontinue dealing with it and had thereby eliminated it from the wholesale
liquor distribution business in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 2 This
concerted refusal to deal had followed plaintiff's failure to adhere to maximum
resale prices which defendants sought to impose on distributors. Defendant
House of Seagram is a wholly-owned subsidiary of defendant Joseph E. Seagram
and markets the parent corporation's product through seven unincorporated sales
divisions. Plaintiff requested the court to instruct the jury to treat three of the
unincorporated sales divisions, Calvert, Four Roses and Frankfort, as separate
entities in determining whether there had been a conspiracy among them in
violation of the antitrust laws. The court instructed the jury in conformance with
plaintiff's request 3 and, in a memorandum decision, attempted to support its
position that unincorporated divisions of the same parent corporation were
capable of entering into a conspiracy within the meaning of the Sherman Act.
HawaiianOke & Liquors, Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp.
915 (D. Hawaii 1967).
The decision in the instant case constitutes a new and generally unexpected
development in the law of intracorporate conspiracy. Section 1 of the Sherman
Act does not prohibit restraint of trade as such, but is directed toward activity
on the part of at least two actors in restraint of trade and, therefore, cannot be
violated by the activity of a single person. 4 Section 2,r on the other hand, may
1. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964) provides: "Any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue
therefore .

.

. and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained . ..

."

2. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964) provides: "Every contract, combination in
the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is
declared to be illegal . . . .'

3. The actual instruction given to the jury by the court provided: "Calvert Distilling
Co., Four Roses Distilling Co. and Frankfort Distilling Co. were each separate unincorporated divisions of the defendant House of Seagram, Inc. at the time that each terminated
dealings with Hawaiian Oke.
"Each of these divisions of defendant House of Seagram, Inc., shall be treated by you as
separate entities for the purpose of determining whether or not there has been a combination
or conspiracy, as I have heretofore defined those terms, to terminate Hawaiian Oke as their
respective distributor. For the purposes of returning a verdict, however, you will consider
these divisions as being the defendant House of Seagram Inc." Hawaiian Oke & Liquors,
Ltd. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 915, 916 (D. Hawaii 1967).
4. Handier, Some Misadventures in Antitrust Policymaking, 76 Yale L.J. 92, 120-21

(1966).
5. Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964) provides: "Every person who shall monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons ...
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor .... "
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be violated by the activity of a single person, and it is only when a conspiracy to
monopolize is charged that two or more actors must be involved., Although a
section 1 restraint of trade could in some cases be termed a part of an overall plan
to monopolize and be attacked under section 2 without proving a concert of
action between at least two parties,7 the necessity of proving specific intent to
monopolize under section 2 has induced many plaintiffs to bring section 1 actions
and to attempt to prove the existence of conspiracies within corporate and multicorporate structures. 8
The case of United States v. General Motors Corp. was one of the first instances of the application of section 1 to a multicorporate enterprise. The defendant was charged with having criminally conspired with its wholly-owned, but
separately incorporated sales and financing subsidiaries for the purpose of
compelling new and used car dealers to finance sales through the defendant's own
financing subsidiary. Although the defendant corporation contended that as a
single business unit it was incapable of conspiring with itself, the Seventh
Circuit held that each incorporated subsidiary was a separate person for purposes of conspiracy and that multicorporate organization subjected the defendant
to liability under section 1.
The rule postulated in General Motors provided the basis for a section 1 action
in the later case of United States v. Yellow Cab Co.10 The defendant was
charged with having conducted an anticompetitive operation in which it attained
ownership and control over taxicab operating companies in four major cities,
separately incorporated these companies as affiliates of the parent defendant and
then required them to purchase their vehicles exclusively from a single manufacturer. The defendant sought to avoid the charge of conspiracy by a showing that
the operating companies were all affiliated and that agreements between the
affiliates and the parent corporation were conducted within the confines of a
single business unit, and not among separate entities. Unlike General Motors, the
multicorporate organization in Yellow Cab was allegedly formed for the purposes of restraining trade and creating a monopoly, and the illegal practices were
not adopted within a previously existing enterprise. The Court recognized this
distinction in finding the defendant guilty on the grounds that: "any affiliation or
integration flowing from an illegal conspiracy cannot insulate the conspirators
from the sanctions which Congress has imposed."" Therefore, the Yellow Cab
decision does not rest solely on the intracorporate conspiracy theory found in
General Motors but turns also on the finding that the enterprise itself was the
2
product of a conspiracy to restrain trade.'
6. Handler, supra note 4, at 121.
7. Id. at 122.
8. See Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy under the Sherman Act, 63 Yale LJ. 372, 374
(1954). Among the advantages of a section 1 action listed by the author the most significant
and persuasive are the lighter burden of proof and an extension of the statute of limitations

where conspiracy is alleged.
9. 121 F.2d 376 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 618 (1941).
10. 332 U.S. 218 (1947).

11. Id. at 227.
12. See Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 3S
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The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was firmly established in KieferStewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,' 3 a case involving the present defendant. As in the instant case, the plaintiff alleged a section 1 conspiracy among
the defendant's wholly-owned subsidiaries for their refusal to continue dealing

with it because it would not adhere to maximum resale prices. The major distinction between Kiefer-Stewart and the instant case is that the defendant's
subsidiaries were separately incorporated then, whereas in the instant case, as a
result of a subsequent reorganization, they were unincorporated divisions of the
parent. The defendant in Kiefer-Stewart relied on a single business unit theory,
but the Court, citing Yellow Cab, observed that "this suggestion runs counter
to our past decisions that common ownership and control does not liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws."'1 4 While the decision in Yellow
Cab undoubtedly supported the Court's holding and was correctly cited as a
basis for finding a conspiracy within a multicorporate enterprise, its use as a
precedent in Kiefer-Stewart unfortunately blurred the essential factual differences between the two cases. Whereas the illegal conspiracy in Kiefer-Stewart
arose within the confines of a pre-existing enterprise, the illegal conspiracy in
Yellow Cab included formation of the enterprise itself.
Kiefer-Stewart represented the Supreme Court's first positive application of the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to practices within a pre-existing multicorporate enterprise and also marked the first time a conspiracy was found on a
horizontal level among the incorporated subsidiaries without the participation of
5
the parent
The failure of the single unit defense in negating a charge of conspiracy
within multicorporate enterprises induced many attempts to extend the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Thus, in Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola,' the plaintiff alleged a conspiracy between the officers and agents of a
single corporation. The court reasoned that a conspiracy requires at least two
persons or entities and that a corporation is only a single entity. Since the acts of
the agent are deemed to be those of the corporation, the requisite dual activity
inherent in a conspiracy did not exist. The court, therefore, refused to enlarge
the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine and observed that separate corporate
entities are needed for its application.17 This holding, that a conspiracy cannot
exist between officers and agents within the confines of a single corporation, has
been widely accepted as the general rule.'8
Miss. L.. 5, 12 (1963); McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section 1
of the Sherman Act, 41 Va. L. Rev. 183, 195 (1955).
13. 340 U.S. 211 (1951).
14. Id. at 215.
15. Having established the applicability of the doctrine to pre-existing enterprises the

Court encountered no barrier in also finding a conspiracy among a parent corporation and
its separately incorporated foreign subsidiaries. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United
States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
16. 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953).

17. 200 F.2d at 914.
18. See, e.g., Mackay v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 237 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1956), appeal dismissed per stipulation, 355 U.S. 865 (1957); Herren Candy Co. v. Curtiss Candy Co, 153
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The finding of section 1 conspiracies in cases where the conspirators were
separately incorporated entities within a multicorporate enterprise and the
refusal to find a conspiracy within the confines of a single corporate unit led to
the conclusion that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine could be evaded "if
a company does business through unincorporated branches, divisions or departments .. .. *"19 The form of the organization became the determinative
factor in construing the legality of corporate agreements and led to the concession on the part of Justice Department and FTC prosecutors that "single
corporate form is a defense per se."' 20 This theory, was confirmed in Poller v.
Columbia BroadcastingSystem, Inc.,21 which held that a parent corporation and
its unincorporated division were incapable of conspiring within the meaning of
section 1 because they did not satisfy the requirement of at least two separate
entities. The Poller decision has been accepted by other courts as dispositive of a
situation involving agreements between a corporate parent and its unincorporated
22
divisions.
A few years after the Kiefer-Stewart decision, and in reliance on the nascent
theory that single corporate form would shield an enterprise from liability for
conspiracy under section 1, the present defendant underwent a reorganization of
its corporate structure on July 31, 1954.23 The incorporated subsidiaries which
had been found guilty of conspiracy in Kiefer-Stewart, including Calvert, Four
Roses and Frankfort, became unincorporated sales divisions of the marketing
company House of Seagram. Seagrams relied solely upon the Poller line of cases
and the single corporate holding in Nelson Radio in opposing the plaintiff's
requested charge before the instant court and argued that these decisions prevented a finding of conspiracy among unincorporated divisions within a single
corporate entity.24 The court, on the other hand, reasoned that these purported
precedents were not controlling in the instant case since they dealt with vertical
agreements between parent and division and the present case involved a horizontal agreement among the divisions themselves. Therefore, the court treated
the case as one of first impression and proceeded to formulate standards for
reaching a decision.
Relying on the case of Reines Distributors,Inc. v. Admiral Corp.,2r the court
held that the relationship between the parent and unincorporated division will
determine whether a conspiracy can exist and that divisions which function as
separate entities without the supervision of the parent must be treated as sepaF. Supp. 751 (N.). Ga. 1957); Whiteley v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 151 F. Supp. 914 (W.D.
Ark. 1957), aff'd, 254 F.2d 36 (8th Cir. 1958); Marion County Co-op. Ass'n v. Carnation
Co., 114 F. Supp. 58 (W.D. Ark. 1953), aft'd, 214 F.2d 557 (8th Cir. 1954).
19. Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. to Study the Antitrust Laws 35 (1955). See also Handler,
supra note 4, at 122; McQuade, supra note 12, at 183; Note, The Nature of a Sherman
Act Conspiracy, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 1108 (1954).
20. Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy under the Sherman Act, 63 Yale L.J. 372, 388
(1954).
21. 284 F.2d 599 (D.C. Cir. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
22. See, e.g., Deterjet Corp. v. United Aircraft Corp., 211 F. Supp. 348 (D. Del. 1962);
Johnny Maddox Motor Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 202 F. Supp. 103 (W.D. Tex. 1960).
23. 272 F. Supp. at 920.
24. Id. at 918.
25. 256 F. Supp. 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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rate entities for purposes of being capable of conspiracy.20 The Reines case,
however, applied this test of autonomy to the question of whether an unincorporated division could be a purchaser from the parent within the meaning of the
Robinson-Patman Act 27 and specifically stated that the rationale of the cases
holding that a parent and unincorporated division are a single entity "seems
logical in Sherman Act cases," 28 while noting that those cases "dealt with a
quite different antitrust problem. " 29
There was ample testimony offered by defendants' officers to support a conclusion that the sales divisions were autonomous units which outwardly, and in
most cases internally, competed with one another without any supervision or
control from the parent corporation. The testimony further showed that the
agreement among Calvert, Four Roses and Frankfort to discontinue dealing with
the plaintiff was reached without any directives from the parent and that an
agreement of this nature was solely within the province of the sales divisions.
This intracorporate independence provided the basis for the court's conclusion
that, in conformance with its inapplicable standard, the sales divisions were
capable of conspiring with one another in contravention of the provisions of
section L30
There is, however, other language in the opinion which may provide the key
to the court's decision and limit the scope of its holding. The court discussed the
defendants' reorganization in light of the facts and holding of Kiefer-Stewart
and made the observation that the internal structure and marketing techniques of
the corporation had not substantially changed since the earlier decision. 31 In
other words, the change in corporate form had not been accompanied by a corresponding change in the internal structure of the new enterprise, and the sales
divisions had retained the autonomous character they had had as separtely incorporated subsidiaries. The critical question for the jury might have been: "For
what purpose did the defendants reorganize their corporate structure?" Yellow
Cab, which held that liability for a conspiracy to restrain trade wherein organization into a single business unit, albeit in multicorporate form, was necessary for
the success of the restraint could not be avoided by a defense of single business
entity, has subsequently been used as precedent for finding conspiracy within
pre-existing multicorporate enterprises." However, Yellow Cab also found conspiracy in the reorganization itself. Thus, in HighlandSupply Corp. v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 38 it was found that where a conspiracy in restraint of trade included
merger or affiliation as a means of effectuating the restraint and avoiding liability,
the single entity defense would not protect the resulting corporate defendant from
liability under section 1. In Beacon Fruit & Produce Co. v. H. Harris& Co.,31 a
corporation which had been formed as an instrumentality for securing control
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31,
32,
33.
34.

272 F. Supp. at 919-20.
15 U.S.C. § 13 (1964).
256 F. Supp. at 583.
Id. at 585.
272 F. Supp. at 924.
Id. at 921.
See text accompanying note 14 supra.
238 F. Supp. 561 (E.D. Mo. 1965).
152 F. Supp. 702 (D. Mass. 1957).
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of a market and imposing a restraint of trade upon the buyers could not avail
itself of the single entity defense because the conspiracy included formation of
the corporation. It is not inconceivable, then, that Yellow Cab may be extended
to cases where a reorganization, though not necessary for the commission of the
restraint itself, was effected for the purpose of clothing the restraint in legality,
in the sense that the dual entity requirement of section 1 would be unfulfilled in
the reorganized form. If defendant's purpose in reorganizing was not to protect
itself from liability for normal business agreements among its subsidiaries but
to continue the illegal practices, which Kiefer-Stewart forbade, behind the shield
of a single corporate entity, the resulting single corporate form should not have
protected it from liability in the instant case. The conspiracy in restraint of trade,
if there was one, might have been the agreement among separately incorporated
entities to reorganize into a single corporate unit in order to continue the illegal
practice which their old form of organization prohibited. Therefore, the proper
charge to the jury, reached upon a true interpretation of the facts and an accurate application of precedents, might have been more arguably correct had it
stated that the intent of the defendants in formation of the single corporate unit
determined the question of whether a conspiracy had taken place prior to the
reorganization and that an agreement occurring after the reorganization could
not constitute a conspiracy because the requisite of two separate actors would
not be met.
The fact that the instant court went beyond the single corporate shield to find
in the unincorporated divisions the separate entities requisite for a conspiracy
reflects a current trend in judicial thinking. That disregard of the corporate
form is now being used as an approach for enforcing the substantive prohibitions of the antitrust laws is evident in the recent Supreme Court decision in
United States v. Sealy, Inc.2 5 Sealy was charged with having violated section 1
by allocating mutually exclusive territories among its licensees. Although vertical
territorial allocation had not previously been held per se illegal, the Court found
that these agreements were in reality horizontal allocations, which were per se
illegal, and did so by going beyond the corporate shield of the defendant and
finding that the licensees themselves owned substantially all of the defendant's
stock and controlled its board of directors as well as the day-to-day business of
the corporation. 6 In the instant case, however, the enjoyment by the divisions
of a high degree of autonomy in performing those functions for which they were
responsible seems insufficient ground for disregarding the single corporate form
of the enterprise and for the court's abrogation of the dual entity requirement
of Sherman Act section 1.

Constitutional Law-Social Welfare-Residence Requirement Held to
Violate Welfare Recipient's Constitutional Right to Free Interstate Travel.
-Plaintiff, an indigent mother with one child and another expected, moved
from Boston, where she had been receiving welfare payments for her dependent
child, to Hartford to be near her mother. The Boston payments were discon35.

388 U.S. 350 (1967).

36. Id. at 352-53.
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tinued because of plaintiff's change of residence. Plaintiff's application to
Connecticut for aid under a similar program was denied because she failed to
meet the state's one year residence requirement' although she was otherwise
eligible.2 She sued to obtain these payments from the Connecticut Commissioner
of Welfare, and the Federal District Court of Connecticut held in a 2-1 decision s that the residence requirement was an unconstitutional violation of
plaintiff's right to travel and to establish residence in any state of the union.
Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967), prob. juris. noted,
36 U.S.L.W. 3286 (Jan. 16, 1968).
Three steps are logically necessary for the court to reach the instant decision.
First, the right to interstate travel must be established. Although the right to
interstate travel does not appear in the Constitution in haec verba, several
clauses of the Constitution have been consistently interpreted as establishing it.4
Secondly, the residence requirement must be shown to infringe upon this right.
It is arguable that a welfare residence requirement5 protects a state's taxpayers
from being forced to subsidize the travel of another state's indigents, rather
than directly limiting indigents' right to travel freely among the states.0 This
approach has been rejected by the courts.7 Residence requirements for public
aid have been ruled unconstitutional in four states and the District of Columbia.8 Although the extent of the right to interstate travel has not been dearly
defined, 9 the leading Supreme Court authority in this area, Edwards v. Cali1. Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17-2d (Supp. 1966). Before this provision was enacted by the
Connecticut Legislature in 1965, Connecticut had no residence requirement for this program.
2. Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331, 333 (D. Conn. 1967), prob. juris. noted, 36
U.S.L.W. 3286 (Jan. 16, 1968).
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 2282 (1964). This section forbids the issuance of an injunction restraining enforcement, operation or execution of an Act of Congress for repugnance to the
Constitution, except by a three-judge district court.
4. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959);
Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908);
Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867).
The instant court found the Connecticut statute to violate the "privilege and immunities"
clause and the "equal protection" clause of the fourteenth amendment. For a discussion of all
the clauses possibly violated by welfare residence requirements, see Harvith, The Constitutionality of Residence Tests for General and Categorical Assistance Programs, 54 Calif. L.
Rev. 567 (1966).
S. 'Welfare residence requirement" refers to the requirement of a certain duration of
residence (such as one year in the instant requirement). The constitutionality of denying
non-residents welfare aid is not under discussion.
6. The rationalization for this argument can be traced back to that used for the Elizabethan poor laws. See H. Hirsch, Our Settlement Laws (1933). See also Mandelker, The
Settlement Requirement in General Assistance, 1955 Wash. U.L.Q. 355-56.
7. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 767 (1966); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S.
160, 174-75 (1941).
8. See Harrell v. Tobriner, 36 U.S.L.W. 2283 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 1967). The four states
are Delaware, Green v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 270 F. Supp. 173 (D. Del. 1967);
Pennsylvania, Smith v. Reynolds (E.D. Pa. 1967) (pendente lite); Wisconsin and illinois,
both also in 1967. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1967, at 20, col. 3.
9. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 758 (1966); New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1,
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fornia,'0

declared unconstitutional a California statute which made it a misdemeanor to bring an indigent non-resident into the state."1 Edwards thus
implies that residence requirements may violate the right to interstate travel.12
While the statute in the Edwards case, like the instant statute, did not directly
prevent an indigent from entering California,1 3 it did have a definitely chilling
effect on the ability of many indigents to enter the state and thus, on their
right to travel freely.1 4 In 1966, in United States v. Guest,'3 the Court again
implied that actions or laws which even discourage interstate travel (by making
it less feasible) infringe upon the right to interstate travel.' 0 Since it is impractical for a welfare recipient who has met the residence requirement in one
state to cut off his only source of income by moving to another state that
refuses to provide him with a new source of income, the instant residence requirement does indirectly infringe upon an indigent's right to interstate travel. 17
The third and critical step is to negate the possibility that the residence
requirement in question is a justifiable infringement on the right. While statutes
are generally presumed constitutional, 8 there is a marked weakening of that
presumption when a possible abrogation of first amendment rights is involved, 1
and a recent Supreme Court case, Aptheker v. Secretary of State)20 indicated
that where the statute involved may infringe upon fourteenth amendment rights
(like the right to interstate travel 21 ) a similar weakening of the presumption of
constitutionality will be effected. 22 This is not to say that the state can never,
in the exercise of its "police powers," constitutionally restrict a fourteenth
14-15 (1959) (dissenting opinion); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 183
curring opinion).
10. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
11. The statute was § 2615 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code
12. 314 U.S. at 172. Mr. Justice Jackson, concurring, said "Any measure
divide our citizenry on the basis of property into one class free to move from

(1941)

(con-

(1901).
which would
state to state

and another class that is poverty-bound to the place where it has suffered misfortune is not
only at war with the habit and custom by which our country has expanded, but is also a
shortsighted blow at the security of property itself." Id. at 185.
13. Id. at 176.
14. Id. at 173.

15. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). In this case, the defendants used violence in an attempt to
prevent Negroes from traveling in interstate commerce.
16. Id. at 760. See 270 F. Supp. at 336.
17. 270 F. Supp. at 336.
18. B. Arneson, Elements of Constitutional Law 49-50 (1928).

19.
rights
20.
21.
22.

See Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 US. 500, 517 (1964). The first amendment
are freedom of "religion," "speech," "press" and "to assemble."
378 U.S. 500 (1964).
See note 4 supra.
In Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, Justice Goldberg asserted that

"freedom of travel is a constitutional liberty closely related to rights of free speech and
association... ." Id. at 517. Justice Douglas reiterated this in his concurring opinion, Id, at
520. The new-found importance of fourteenth amendment rights exists partly because most
civil rights decisions arise out of interpretations of the "privileges and immunities" and
"equal protection" clauses of the fourteenth amendment. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966).
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amendment right by statute.' All state residence requirements have some
tendency to restrict interstate travel; but when the need for the requirement outweighs the infringement of the right, it may be said that there is a sufficiently
compelling reason for enacting the statute. 24 In such cases, the residence requirement is a constitutional exercise of state's rights. 231 For example, the need
for qualified public officials familiar with local problems sufficiently justifies
residence requirements for holding office.26 Similarly, residence requirements for
voting are constitutional because they prevent those who would fraudulently
control state or local election results by importing nonconstituent voters2
Is there a sufficiently compelling reason to restrict the right to interstate
travel by requiring a period of residence in order to receive welfare benefits?
Only three days after the instant decision, a federal district court held constitutional a welfare residence requirement in a case based on facts closely
paralleling the facts in the instant case.28 Judge Holtzoff, in the Federal District
Court of the District of Columbia, justified the residence requirement as necessary to protect the taxpayers,29 to prevent a mass migration of indigents seeking
to take advantage of Washington, D.C.'s generous welfare programs.30 Judge
Clarie, in the dissenting opinion in the instant case, applied precisely this argument to the Connecticut residence requirement. 31 Neither Judge Holtzoff nor
Judge Clarie offered factual documentation in support of his prediction. The
District of Columbia holding has been overruled 32 (still at the district court
level) in an opinion which failed to advert to the possibility of extensive
migration. Without citing authority, the instant majority rejected, as unfounded,
predictions of a vastly increased welfare burden.m Clearly, New York (the
largest of the three states that have not enacted any meaningful residence requirement 34) has experienced continuing and significant increases in its welfare
23. See, e.g., New York v. O'Neill, 359 U.S. 1, 5 (1959); Edwards v. California, 314
US. 160, 172, 184 (1941); New York v. Miln, 36 US. (11 Pet.) 102, 143 (1837). These
"police powers" are reserved for the state in the tenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
24. The instant majority noted that if welfare residence requirements were necessary to
prevent fraud, they would undoubtedly be justified. The defendant testified, however, that
prevention of fraud was not a purpose for the requirement. 270 F. Supp. at 338.
25. Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 614 (1960); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160,
172-73 (1941).
26. See The Alvelino-Rosales Case, Residence Qualifications for Public Officers, 27 Phil.
LU. 894 (1952).
27. See Harvith, supra note 4, at 623-26. See generally, Schmidhauser, Residency
Requirements for Voting and the Tensions of a Mobile Society, 61 Mich. L. Rev. 643 (1963).
28. Harrell v. Board of Comm'rs, 269 F. Supp. 919 (D.D.C. 1967).
29. Id. at 921.
30. Id.
31. 270 F. Supp. at 341.
32. Harrell v. Tobriner, 36 U.S.L.W. 2283 (D.D.C. Nov. 8, 1967).
33. 270 F. Supp. at 337.
34. N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law §§ 117, 131, 132, 138, 139, 157, 158. New York does have a
"removal" restriction, permitting the state to return any applicant, who came solely to
obtain welfare, back to his original home. N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 139-a. For obvious
reasons of cost of investigation, the statute is ineffective. See Harvith, supra note 4, at 623.
The other two states with no welfare residence requirements are Hawaii and Rhode Island.
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burden. Whether these increases stem from the combination of relatively
generous welfare benefits 6 with the absence of a waiting period is not clear.
The two studies which have been made (one of which involved New York)
indicate that indigents do not enter states in order to obtain welfare advantages.8 7 These studies, however, are too few, too old and inadequate. 88
Assuming that indigents do not come to a state in order to obtain generous
welfare payments, why do they come? If it could be shown that vast numbers
of indigents are coerced into leaving their original home by racial discrimination,89 would the burdened state be justified in enacting or retaining a residence
requirement? In determining whether the requirement is justified, the courts
must necessarily examine the goals of welfare programs and the effect of a
residence requirement on these goals, as well as the importance of protecting
the taxpayer. In fairness to both indigents and taxpayers, financial welfare
assistance should be a temporary part of constructive programs which will
enable most recipients to [re]-establish themselves as productive members of
society. Unfortunately, most of today's welfare beneficiaries remain permanently
apart from the economic mainstream and constitute a self-perpetuating drain
upon the other members of society.40 This problem demands a more comprehensive attack than that which is offered by present welfare laws. 41 Psychologically, welfare recipients need to develop the realization that the future includes
a realistic possibility of economic self sufficiency. 42 By recognizing that an indigent, like any other citizen, has the right to unfettered interstate travel, the
instant case accords with the trend recognizing the dignity of the
welfare
48
recipient as a person, which is vital to his psychological resuscitation.
As an important step in solving the problems of welfare, employment must be
35. See, e.g., Bureau of Family Services, United States Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare,
Advance Release of Statistics on Public Assistance (Sept. 19, 1965); N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1967,
at 51, col. 4; id., July 30, 1967, § 1 at 66, cols. 1-7.
36. See Bureau of Family Services, supra note 35, at table 7. See also N.Y. Daily News,
Nov. 20, 1967, at 2, cols. 1, 2.
37. E.g., N.Y. State Dep't of Welfare, The Movement of Population and Public Welfare
in New York State (1958); see Harvith, supra note 4, at 615-19, for a discussion of both
studies. The other state studied was Rhode Island.
38. Harvith, supra note 4, at 616-19.
39. See N.Y. Daily News, Nov. 20, 1967, at 2, cols. 1-2. See generally Miller, Race,
Poverty, and the Law, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 386 (1966).
40. See, e.g., Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 326,
356 (1966); N.Y. Post, Nov. 28, 1967, at 45, cols. 1-3.

41.

See, e.g., Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 Calif.

L. Rev. 479 (1966); Wedemeyer & Moore, supra note 40; N.Y. Times, July 30, 1967, § 1,

at 66, cols. 1-7.
42. See LoGatto, Residence Laws-A Step Fonvard or Backward? 7 Catholic Law.
101, 106 (1961). See generally Diamond, The Children of Leviathan: Psychoanalytic Speculations Concerning Welfare Law and Punitive Sanctions, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 357 (1966);
Briar, Welfare From Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System, 54 Calif. L.
Rev. 370 (1966).
43. Note, Residence Requirements in State Public Welfare Statutes, 51 Iowa L. Rev.
1080, 1090 (1966); Briar, supra note 42, at 384-85; LoGatto, supra note 42, at 111.
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made available to the employable unemployed. 4" Unquestionably, indigent
mobility is job productive. 45 By destroying an impediment to mobility, the
instant case has tempered the hard economic realities which confront those who
are trying to escape the poverty syndrome. In light of the psychological and
economic advantages which accrue from this mobility, and regardless of the
real reason for indigent migration 4 6 the protection of public funds is not a

reason which sufficiently compels a welfare residence requirement.
Connecticut is not the only state that requires a period of residency before an
indigent can qualify for assistance. The basic types of federal and state welfare
programs in operation today have been classified as general assistance programs
and categorical assistance programs. 47 General assistance is a form of welfare
program financed entirely without federal funds. The length of general assistance residence requirements is at the discretion of the state.4 8 Categorical
assistance programs are those authorized in the Social Security Act and are
available to people who fall into certain dassifications 49 (for example, dependent children as in the instant case). The federal government contributes
funds in qualifying categorical state plans. 50 A qualifying state may enact a
residence requirement provided it does not exceed the period of time specified
in the Social Security Act.51 If the infringement on interstate travel caused by the
instant residence requirement is not constitutionally justified as a necessary
44. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 39, at 401; Note, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 1080, 1088-86 (1965);
N.Y. Daily News, Nov. 20, 1967, at 2, cols. 1-2.
45. Note, 51 Iowa L. Rev. 1080, 1085 (1966); LoGatto, supra note 42, at 111; N.Y.
Daily News, Nov. 20, 1967, at 2, col. 2.
46. Harrell v. Tobriner, 36 US.L.W. 2283 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 1967); see text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
47. See Harvith, supra note 4, at 567-68.
48. There are nearly as many different requirements as there are programs. The longest
is five years: eg., N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 164:1 (1964 rep. ed.). The -hortest is none,
found in three states (Hawaii, New York, Rhode Island): e.g., Havaii Rev. Laws
§§ 108-15 (Supp. 1963). For a complete table, see Note, S1 Iowa L. Rev. 1080, 1091-9S
(1966).
49. The categories are (1) Old Age Assistance, Social Security Act; (2) Medical
Assistance for the Aged, Title I, 49 Stat. 620 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06
(1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 302-06 (Supp. I 1965); (3) Aid to the Blind, Social
Security Act, Title X, 49 Stat. 645 (1935), as amended, 42 US.C. §§ 1201-06 (1964), as
amended, 42 US.C. §§ 1202-06 (Supp. I 1965); (4) Aid to the Disabled, Social Security
Act, Title XIV, 64 Stat. 555 (1950), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351-55 (1964), as amended,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1352-55 (Supp. I 1965); (5) Programs combining any of the previous four,
Social Security Act, Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-8S (1964), as amended, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1382-85 (Supp. I 1965); (6) Medical Assistance under Title XM 79 Stat. 343, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1396-96d (Supp. I 1965); (7) Aid to Needy Families with Children, Social
Security Act, Title IV, 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (1964), as
amended, 42 US.C. §§ 602-06 (Supp. I 1965).
50. These federal restrictions are found in the sections authorizing the programs, cited
in note 49.
81. To qualify for federal funds, state requirements for Old Age Assistance, Aid to the
Blind, Aid to the Disabled, and combinations of them, may not exceed five of the nine
years immediately preceding application and continuous residence during the last year.
Medical Assistance programs must be open to all residents without regard to duration of
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protection of public funds,52 neither are the residence requirements for other
states' categorical and general assistance programs so justified.58
If it is true that states, such as New York, which have superior benefits, 4
are bearing a heavy burden for refusing to enact a residence requirement,65 the
instant decision portends a lessening of this burden. If all residence requirements are declared unconstitutional, the number of states from which an indigent seeking to change his residence may realistically choose will be increased,
and presumably formerly protected states will share increasingly the burden of
new resident indigents.
The instant decision may call into question the constitutionality of residence
requirements for state universities5 ' 6 There are, however, better reasons for state
university residence requirements than for welfare residence requirements.
Welfare residence requirements affect the very economic subsistence of the
indigent seeking to change his residence. Residence requirements for state universities affect only the possibility of a slight educational advantage. Moreover,
most of those who are dissuaded from travel by university residence requirements are non-indigents who can afford to meet the period of residence required
to be admitted to the state school. The prospect of many non-indigent students
moving to a state such as California to take advantage of its highly regarded,
free, state universities, seems far more likely than that of many indigents changing states to obtain welfare advantages.5 7 And states certainly should not be
discouraged from having a good state university system by making them accept

newly arrived residents.58 Thus, avoiding a greater tax burden would seem a
constitutionally valid purpose for university residence requirements while the
same reasoning cannot be used to render welfare residence requirements constitutional.
residence. The maximum residence requirement for programs involving dependent children
is one year; or if the child is under age one, not in excess of one year's residence by a parent
before the child's birth. 49 Stat. 627 (1935), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 602(b) (2) (1964).
Forty states require the one year maximum, the other ten having no wait (Alaska, Georgia,
Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, North Dakota, South Dakota, New York, Rhode Island and
Vermont). See N.Y. Times, Jan. 16, 1967, at 21, col. 1; Note, 51 Iowa L. Rev. at 1091-95.
52. 270 F. Supp. at 337-38.
53. Harrell v. Tobriner, 36 U.S.L.W. 2283, 2284 (D.D.C. Nov. 14, 1967) (dissenting
opinion Holtzoff, J.).
54. See note 36 supra.
55. The Conservative Party of New York maintains this, as evidenced by a press
release from its State Vice-Chairman, Charles E. Rice, occasioned by his proposition at
the New York State Constitutional Convention that New York adopt a one year public
welfare residence requirement. It is known that one million of the two million Negroes
who left the South from 1960 to 1965 found their way to New York City. See N.Y. Daily
News, Nov. 20, 1967, at 2, col. 2.
56. See Harvith, supra note 4, at 662; cf. Wall St. I., June 20, 1967, at 14, col. 6.
57. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
58. Proponents of welfare residence requirements apply this same argument to welfare
programs. They claim that absent all residence requirements on welfare programs, the
states will soon be competing to present the least attractive program to the migrating Indigent. 270 F. Supp. at 339 (dissenting opinion Clarie, J.). In light of the fact that every
state has some form of welfare program, when none are required by law, this contention
seems unlikely.

